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CREATING CONFUSION RATHER THAN 
CLARITY: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S (LACK 
OF) DECISION IN TREE OF LIFE 
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v. UPPER ARLINGTON 
Abstract: There is currently a split among five federal circuits as to what consti-
tutes a secular comparator to a religious assembly or institution under the equal 
terms provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 
Stemming from this initial split, courts have further divided as to what is neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case for an equal terms claim. On May 18, 2016, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Tree of Life Christian Schools 
v. Upper Arlington became the most recent circuit to address the equal terms pro-
vision. Rather than providing a clear articulation of the equal terms provision, 
however, the Sixth Circuit refused to officially adopt a position regarding the cir-
cuit split. This Comment argues that in abstaining from formally expressing a le-
gal standard for determining violations of the equal terms provision, the Sixth 
Circuit shirked its appellate duty to create clarity and encourage uniformity. 
INTRODUCTION 
The equal terms provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) prohibits state and local governments from executing 
or enforcing land use regulations in a way “that treats a religious assembly or 
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institu-
tion.”1Given that the provision forbids the government from treating religious 
and secular organizations unequally, comparator evidence is necessary to de-
termine whether a land use regulation or restriction violates the statute.2 A 
comparator, for the purposes of illustrating disparate treatment, is an individual 
or entity that is similar to the plaintiff except that the comparator is not a 
member of the plaintiff’s protected class.3 While the language of the provision 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2012). 
 2 See id. (stating that the unequal treatment of religious and secular institutions is unlawful in 
regards to a government’s application of land use regulation). 
 3 Comparator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[s]omething with which something 
else is compared; esp., something or someone treated differently from something or someone else and 
used as evidence of unlawful treatment of the latter”); see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the 
Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 193–94  (2009) (explaining the 
general meaning of the term comparator and its origin in the discrimination context). Courts often use 
comparators to discern unlawful disparate treatment between parties in discrimination cases. See Su-
zanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745 (2011) (discussing 
courts’ ubiquitous reliance upon evidence of disparate treatment from comparators to support findings 
of discrimination); Sullivan, supra, at 193 (discussing the growing trend of discrimination cases being 
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implicitly directs the use of comparator evidence, its general terms—
specifically “nonreligious assembly or institution”—make it unclear as to what 
is a proper nonreligious comparator to a religious organization.4 As a result of 
this ambiguity, many federal circuits have developed competing definitions 
and legal tests for what constitutes an appropriate secular comparator under 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.5 To further complicate the construction of 
the equal terms provision, circuits have adopted conflicting standards of judi-
cial scrutiny as well as frameworks for allocating the parties’ burden of proof.6 
                                                                                                                           
determined by a plaintiff’s identification of a comparator that received better treatment). While schol-
arly commentary typically discusses comparators in the context of workplace discrimination, compar-
ators used for the purposes of illustrating disparate treatment between religious and secular institutions 
to establish a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim carry the same 
meaning. See Goldberg, supra, at 734 n.13 (explaining that while her argument is developed primarily 
through identity discrimination law within the employment context, her analysis could apply to other 
forms of discrimination that are beyond the scope of her article); Sullivan, supra, at 193, 198 (discuss-
ing first the use of comparators generally in discrimination claims, and then narrowing the article’s 
discussion to fit within the framework of individual disparate treatment under Title VII). 
 4 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 193. Because discrimination claimants must sometimes show that 
disparate treatment is motivated by their protected trait, difference in treatment between two otherwise 
similarly situated persons or groups tends to show that the less favorable treatment is because of the 
protected trait. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explain-
ing the role that evidence of disparate treatment plays in proving a discriminatory motive); Goldberg, 
supra note 3, at 731 n.3 (explaining that when it is necessary for plaintiffs to show that the claimant’s 
status was the reason for the defendant’s discriminatory actions, comparators are useful for showing 
causation). Protected characteristics include race, religion, age, and ability. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 
n.15. See generally Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1998) (providing a general background on the nature of antidiscrimina-
tion law in the United States). 
 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (stating the equal terms provision); Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. 
Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV), 823 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2016) (discussing the 
circuit split); see, e.g., Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma (Centro Familiar), 
651 F.3d 1163, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2011) (comparing how an ordinance treated a church versus secular 
membership organizations); Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 626 
F.3d 667, 670–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (comparing a city’s treatment of a church with that of a group of 
hotels which allegedly violated a city’s zoning regulation); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca 
Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty. (Primera Iglesia), 450 F.3d 1295, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2006) (analyzing 
whether the religious plaintiff identified a comparator that would sufficiently illustrate that a zoning 
ordinance violated RLUIPA’s equal terms provision). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
that despite the different circuits’ formulations of the test, they basically have the same outcome. 
Third Church of Christ, Scientist, 626 F.3d at 669. 
 6 See Ryan M. Lore, Comment, When Religion and Land Use Regulations Collide: Interpreting 
the Application of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1339, 1342 (2013) (stat-
ing how courts are divided on the burden of proof framework and the proper standard of judicial scru-
tiny); Thomas E. Raccuia, Note, RLUIPA and Exclusionary Zoning: Government Defendants Should 
Have the Burden of Persuasion in Equal Terms Cases, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1857 (2012) (dis-
cussing how circuits have split in regards to the allocation of the burden of persuasion in RLUIPA 
equal terms provision litigation). Compare Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long 
Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (placing the burden of persuasion on the religious plaintiff 
to show that a regulation provides preferable treatment to the secular comparator, and making the 
government strictly liable if the plaintiff successfully demonstrates disparate treatment), with Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (requiring an application of 
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The complete lack of uniformity amongst the federal circuit courts has made it 
difficult for litigants and affected parties to know what is necessary to pursue 
or protect against a RLUIPA equal terms claim.7 
Most recently, in 2016, the equal terms provision appeared before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Tree of Life Christian Schools v. 
Upper Arlington (“Tree of Life Christian Schools IV”), when a religious school 
asserted that nonreligious organizations such as daycares and ambulatory cen-
ters were proper secular comparators for the purposes of establishing an equal 
terms claim.8 The Sixth Circuit, however, refrained from explicitly adopting a 
test for determining a proper nonreligious comparator under the equal terms 
provision, ultimately allowing the religious plaintiff to identify its own secular 
counterpart to present to the district court as a comparator on remand.9 This 
Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit erred in choosing not to articulate a le-
gal standard for an appropriate comparator.10 Part I of this Comment reviews 
the statutory scheme and background of RLUIPA , the role of appellate courts 
in the judicial system, and discusses the factual and procedural history of Tree 
of Life Christian Schools IV.11 Part II delves into the variety of tests and stand-
ards circuits have developed to address RLUIPA equal terms claims, and ex-
amines the Sixth Circuit’s decision not to formally choose sides amongst this 
split.12 Finally, Part III concludes that in light of the many competing defini-
tions and tests of a proper comparator under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, 
the Sixth Circuit’s failure to adopt or assert its own definition or test will have 
the consequence of creating further confusion and uncertainty for the lower 
courts deciding RLUIPA claims.13 
                                                                                                                           
strict scrutiny to regulations that treat religious organizations differently, and thus adopting a burden-
shifting framework that requires the government to counter a demonstration of disparate treatment by 
showing that the disparate treatment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest). 
 7 See Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Comment, Freedom from Religion: RLUIPA, Religious Free-
dom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 584 (2010) (explaining how 
the inability of the federal courts to reach a uniform interpretation of the equal terms provision has 
made it unclear for parties to know what is required to assert an equal terms claim, raising questions 
as to what qualifies as a nonreligious comparator, what is the effect of a facial versus an as-applied 
challenge to a regulation, and what standard of review is appropriate if there is disparate treatment). 
 8 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 367. 
 9 Id. at 370, 372. 
 10 See infra notes 107–117 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–58 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 59–106 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 107–117 and accompanying text. 
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I. RLUIPA’S CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, THE BACKGROUND OF THE TREE 
OF LIFE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS LITIGATION, AND THE ROLE  
OF APPELLATE COURTS 
 Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000 to provide protections for the reli-
gious freedom of persons, places of worship, religious schools, and other reli-
gious assemblies and institutions.14 RLUIPA protects religious persons and 
institutions by codifying the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, 
using an equal protection-like analysis to ensure that land use regulations and 
zoning laws do not discriminate against religious assemblies and institutions.15 
Section A provides an overview of RLUIPA and the historical context from 
which it emerged.16 Section B reviews the facts and procedural posture of Tree 
of Life Christian Schools IV.17 Section C discusses the role appellate courts 
play in the American judicial system and their obligation to provide clarity to 
muddled legal issues where individuals’ constitutional rights are at stake.18 
A. RLUIPA’s Constitutional Roots and Statutory Framework 
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution constrain the government’s interaction with religion.19 
These two clauses exist in tension with one another, as the Free Exercise 
Clause was designed to prevent the state from interfering or burdening the 
practice of religion, while the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from 
creating or supporting a state religion.20 Consequently, the government must 
ensure the religious autonomy of its citizens without appearing to endorse or 
favor any religion, or religion in general.21 In the past half century, this inher-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) (“An Act To protect religious liberty . . . .”); Lore, 
supra note 6, at 1342 (stating the purpose of RLUIPA’s protections). 
 15 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND 
USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 3 (2010); Terry M. Crist III, Comment, Equally Con-
fused: Construing RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1139, 1148 (2009) (stating 
how RLUIPA was intended to resolve Free Exercise issues regarding land use laws); Lore, supra note 
6, at 1342 (outlining the history of Free Exercise jurisprudence). 
 16 See infra notes 19–36 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 37–50 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); Sean Foley, Comment, RLUIPA’s Equal-Terms Provi-
sion’s Troubling Definition of Equal: Why the Equal-Terms Provision Must Be Interpreted Narrowly, 
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 193, 195 (2010). The Supreme Court incorporated the Free Exercise Clause to the 
states in its 1940 decision Cantwell v. State of Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
 20 Foley, supra note 19, at 195 (observing that the two religion clauses can press opposing poli-
cies). 
 21 Id.; see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (observing that the two religion clauses 
can press opposing policies); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) (“[The] 
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ent tension has played out between the legislature and the courts, with Con-
gress often seeking to bolster the protections of the Free Exercise Clause, and 
the Supreme Court, in turn, reigning in these efforts by enforcing the provi-
sions of the Establishment Clause.22 
Firmly rooted in the Free Exercise Clause, RLUIPA is illustrative of the 
momentum and will behind Congressional efforts to protect individual reli-
gious liberties from government infringement.23 The statute itself is the prod-
uct of a decade long tug-of-war between Congress and the Court regarding the 
degree to which religious liberties should be safeguarded from state and feder-
al government regulation.24 The struggle began in 1990, when the Supreme 
Court departed from its longstanding precedent of reviewing laws that alleged-
ly infringed upon religious liberties under a “compelling state interest” or 
“strict scrutiny test.”25 The Court stated that it would no longer apply the com-
pelling interest test to a neutral and generally applicable law, even if the law 
prohibited conduct central to an individual’s religion.26 
Unhappy with the Court’s ruling, Congress responded by enacting the Re-
ligious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in 1993, which restored the 
compelling interest test and overturned the Court’s decision.27 In 1997, in City 
                                                                                                                           
government must guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, and must take pains not to 
compel people to act in the name of any religion.”). 
 22 Foley, supra note 19, at 196; Lore, supra note 6, at 1344; see Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, 
Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1076–79 (2009) (discussing the 
history of Congressional attempts to increase religious protections under the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Court’s repeated efforts to quell these efforts). 
 23 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,702 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the broad, biparti-
san support for RLUIPA in the Senate, and the historical practice of the Senate’s endorsement of leg-
islation that protects fundamental religious liberties); Campbell, supra note 22, at 1076–79 (discussing 
at length RLUIPA’s origins in Congressional intent to create legislation that would protect citizens’ 
religious autonomy); Foley, supra note 19, at 196–99 (discussing RLUIPA’s roots in Free Exercise 
jurisprudence). 
 24 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,702 (2000) (statement of Sen. Reid) (stating that RLUIPA is the “most 
recent attempt by the Congress to protect the free exercise of religion”); see also Tree of Life Christian 
Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 369 (explaining that RLUIPA is Congress’s latest endeavor to expand federal 
protections to religious liberties); Campbell, supra note 22, at 1076 (discussing how RLUIPA 
emerged from a ten-year-long battle between the courts and Congress); Lore, supra note 6, at 1344–45 
(same); Minervini, supra note 7, at 573 (same). 
 25 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990). This “compel-
ling state interest” test arose from the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner, which held 
that government entities could not enforce a law in a manner that substantially burdened an individual’s 
religious liberty unless that law was justified by a compelling state interest. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
The Smith Court justified overturning Sherbert by reasoning that it does not offend the tenets of the 
Free Exercise Clause if an “incidental effect” of an otherwise legitimate law burdens religious auton-
omy. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 26 Smith, 494 U.S at 886. 
 27 Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 
1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)) (declaring the significance of the 
Freedom of Exercise Clause and that neutral laws may burden religious autonomy as much as laws 
designed specifically to affect religious institutions); see Campbell, supra note 22, at 1077 (explaining 
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of Boerne v. Flores, however, the Court struck down RFRA, asserting that the 
statute was constitutionally invalid as applied against the states because it was 
beyond the limits of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.28 Congress attempted to comply with the Court’s comments in 
Flores in its drafting of the Religious Liberty and Protection Act (“RLPA”), 
but the RLPA ultimately failed when it was unable to pass in the Senate.29 In 
2006, however, Congress was able to pass RLUIPA, which, narrower in scope 
than either the RFRA or the RLPA, applied the compelling state interest test 
only to religious land use and the religious exercise of institutionalized per-
sons.30 
                                                                                                                           
how Congress immediately responded to Smith, intending to overturn its holding and restore the com-
pelling state interest test). 
 28 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 
F.3d at 369 (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1236) (discussing the Court’s decision in City 
of Boerne); Campbell, supra note 22, at 1078; Minervini, supra note 7, at 581. Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids states from creating and enforcing laws that infringe upon the “privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States,” that deprive citizens of their “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,” or that deny citizens “equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the amendment “by 
appropriate legislation.” Id. § 5. The Court in Flores explained that although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides Congress with the power to enforce the amendment against states, it does not bestow 
on Congress the authority to interpret how the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions apply to the 
States. 521 U.S. at 519. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”), however, still applies 
to the federal government because Congress’s constitutional power to bind the federal government is 
not based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Whitney Travis, Note, The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act and Smith: Dueling Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1701, 1710 (2007) (discussing how the Court in City of Boerne did not address the constitutionality of 
RFRA as applied to the federal government). 
 29 146 CONG. REC. 16,702 (2000) (statement of Sen. Reid) (explaining that even though the pro-
visions of the RLPA were similar to those of the RFRA, in that it replicated the RFRA’s strict scrutiny 
standard, Congress attempted to cure the constitutional defects of the RFRA by having the RLPA rely 
on Congress’s Article I powers); Foley, supra note 19, at 199 (discussing the issues that the RLPA 
faced in the Senate). 
 30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-1 (addressing only religious land use and the religious exer-
cise of institutionalized persons); Minervini, supra note 7, at 582 (discussing how RLUIPA’s more 
tailored focus complied with the Court’s holding in Smith). Following the Court’s overruling of RFRA 
in City of Boerne, Congress held numerous hearings to investigate religious discrimination in order to 
create legislation that would effectively protect religious liberties while being within the bounds of Con-
gressional authority. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 23–24 (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 
3; Campbell, supra note 22, at 1081. These hearings produced evidence that demonstrated that state and 
local governments often treated religious institutions less favorably in zoning decisions than comparable 
secular institutions. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 23–24 (1999). Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy 
found that religious discrimination often “lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons 
as traffic, aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’” 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) 
(joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA). The RLPA reached an impasse in the 
Senate when concerns were raised that the RLPA’s provisions could have a negative impact on certain 
state and local civil rights. See id. at 16,702 (statement of Sen. Reid) (noting fears that the RLPA, as 
then drafted, might allow discrimination based on sexual orientation and disability). 
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RLUIPA’s land use provision is organized into two parts: the “substantial 
burden” section and the “discrimination and exclusion” section.31 Subsection 1 
of the “discrimination and exclusion” section is popularly known as the “equal 
terms provision” and states “no government shall impose or implement a land 
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less 
than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”32 
The prima facie case for an equal terms RLUIPA claim requires that a re-
ligious plaintiff establish that it is a religious assembly or institution that is 
subject to a land use regulation which treats it on less than equal terms than a 
nonreligious assembly or institution.33 Courts, however, have struggled with 
determining what qualifies as a nonreligious assembly or institution for the 
purposes of demonstrating disparate treatment, and consequently a circuit split 
has emerged regarding the proper interpretation and adjudication of the equal 
terms provision.34  
Once a religious plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of a violation, the 
statute requires that the government carry the burden of persuasion as to each 
element of the claim.35 Despite the statute’s language, courts have developed 
various burden-shifting frameworks to equal terms claims, splitting on how to 
allocate the burden of persuasion on each party as well as what it means to 
meet a prima facie case.36 
                                                                                                                           
 31 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)–(b); see Campbell, supra note 22, at 1084 (explaining the two-part 
structure of RLUIPA’s land use provision). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). The scope of this Comment focuses on the equal terms provision. See 
infra notes 33–117 and accompanying text (discussing the equal terms provision and the circuit split that 
has emerged regarding its proper interpretation). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
 34 See Lore, supra note 6, at 1350 (noting that the split arose because Congress did not clearly 
articulate the equal terms provision). See generally Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171 (adopting a 
fusion of the Third and Seventh Circuits’ tests, except that it puts the burden of persuasion on the 
government to show that there were no valid comparators); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vil-
lage of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010) (implementing a test similar to the Third Cir-
cuit, except that it substitutes “accepted zoning criteria” for regulatory purpose); Lighthouse Inst. for 
Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266 (asserting that the comparison must be to secular assemblies or 
institutions that are similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose); Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d 
at 1230–32 (holding that a valid comparator could be any nonreligious assembly or institution, and 
that a land use regulation does not violate the equal terms provision if it is narrowly tailored to further 
a compelling government interest). 
 35 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-2(b) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleg-
ing a violation of . . . section 2000cc of this title, the government shall bear the burden of persuasion 
on any element of the claim . . . .”). But see Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 270 
(asserting that the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that the government treated it on less than 
equal terms than a secular institution that had the same impact on the goal of the land use regulation). 
 36 See Raccuia, supra note 6, at 1857 (discussing how circuits have split in regards to the alloca-
tion of the burden of persuasion in RLUIPA equal terms provision litigation). 
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B. Factual and Procedural History of Tree of Life Christian Schools IV 
On January 5, 2011, Tree of Life Christian Schools (“TOL Christian 
Schools”) initiated a suit against the City of Upper Arlington, Ohio in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, alleging religious-based dis-
crimination.37 Among other claims, TOL Christian Schools asserted that the 
City’s land use ordinance, the Unified Development Ordinance (the “UDO”), 
violated RLUIPA’s equal terms and substantial burden provisions both facially 
and as-applied.38 This suit represented the culmination of a two-year struggle 
between TOL Christian Schools and the government of Upper Arlington, 
which began when TOL Christian Schools purchased an office building that 
was unused at the time with the intention of turning the property into a reli-
gious school.39 
The building was the largest office building in Upper Arlington and was 
part of the “ORC Office and Research District” zone (the “ORC District”) un-
der the city’s UDO.40 The UDO does not permit schools nor allow them condi-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. I), 888 
F. Supp. 2d 883, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2012), rev’d and remanded 546 Fed. App’x 580 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 38 Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. II), 536 
Fed. App’x 580, 581 (6th Cir. 2013); UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1.03 (2016) 
(explaining that the Unified Development Ordinance (“UDO”) regulates all land and development in 
Upper Arlington). A facial challenge to a law is when the plaintiff asserts that the law’s textual provi-
sions are inherently unconstitutional. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (describing a 
law to be facially invalid if under “no set of circumstances” would the law be constitutional); Alex 
Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 
(2010). Consequently, in the context of an equal-terms RLUIPA claim, a plaintiff may argue that a 
land use regulation is facially invalid if the provisions of the regulation themselves violate RLUIPA. 
Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308–09. In contrast, a law may be unconstitutional under an “as-
applied” challenge if the law as applied to a plaintiff violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Kreit, 
supra, at 657; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2000). Consequently, a land use regulation or ordinance that is on its 
face neutral may still be invalid under the equal terms provision of RLUIPA if in practice the law in 
question treats religious institutions or assemblies less favorably than its secular comparators. See 
Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308 (describing how a facially neutral land ordinance can violate 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision if the statute is either drafted in a way that places a burden almost 
exclusively on religious institutions or if a government selectively enforces an ordinance against reli-
gious institutions). 
 39 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 367. TOL Christian Schools purchased the office 
building from AOL/Time Warner, whose occupancy had ended several years prior. Id. 
 40 Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. III), 16 
F. Supp. 3d 883, 888 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d and remanded 823 F.3d 365 (2016) (discussing that 
when AOL/Time Warner had previously occupied the office building, it brought in significant tax 
revenue for Upper Arlington, accounting for 29% of the city’s income tax revenue in 2001). The UDO 
specifically describes the purpose of the “ORC Office and Research District” zone (the “ORC District”) 
as: 
[T]o allow offices and research facilities that will contribute to the City’s physical pattern 
of planned, healthy, safe, and attractive neighborhoods . . . [and] provide job opportunities 
and services to residents and contribute to the City’s economic stability. Permitted uses in 
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tional use permits in the ORC district.41 Consequently, to operate a school in a 
commercial office building in the ORC district, the UDO requires parties to 
apply for site-specific rezoning.42 The UDO outlines seven standards that must 
be met in order for a zoning map amendment to the UDO to be approved, one 
of which being that the proposed amendment must “generally conform with 
the master plan.”43 
TOL Christian Schools engaged in lengthy negotiations with Upper Ar-
lington to open its religious school in the empty office building before purchas-
ing it, applying for a conditional use permit and then filing two separate ap-
peals to the Board of Zoning and Planning to no avail.44 After initiating the 
lawsuit against Upper Arlington, TOL Christian Schools submitted an applica-
tion to Upper Arlington seeking to rezone the office building from ORC dis-
trict to residential.45 Upper Arlington denied TOL Christian Schools’ proposed 
zoning amendment after the city’s senior planning officer submitted a staff re-
port to the city council stating that the proposal directly opposed essential 
                                                                                                                           
the ORC district are: business and professional offices, research and development, book 
and periodical publishing, insurance carriers, corporate data centers, survey research firms, 
bank finance and loan offices, outpatient surgery centers, hospitals . . . . 
UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5.03(A)(6) (2016). 
 41 UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5.03(A)–(B). 
 42 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 374–75 (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 43 UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4.04(C), 4.04(C)(5). One of the primary 
objectives of the master plan is to increase Upper Arlington’s tax revenue by adopting economic devel-
opment strategies that that attract high-income professionals. CITY OF UPPER ARLINGTON, 2013 MAS-
TER PLAN: CHAPTER 2 LAND USE 1 (2013); see Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 367 (dis-
cussing how Upper Arlington sought to increase tax revenue through its master plan). 
 44 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 890–91 (discussing the negotiation and 
appeals process). TOL Christian Schools applied for a conditional use permit to house a school in the 
commercial office building, which was denied by the hearing officer because schools are not allowa-
ble conditional uses in the ORC District. Id. at 890. TOL Christian Schools subsequently requested that 
the hearing officer grant them the conditional use permit on the grounds that their application referred to 
their proposed use for the property as a place of worship, and the UDO permits churches and places of 
worship as conditional uses in the ORC District. Id. at 890–91. The hearing officer again denied this 
request, finding that their original conditional use application was not for a church but a “private school 
with ancillary uses.” Id. at 891. TOL Christian Schools appealed each of these decisions to the Board 
of Zoning and Planning (“BZAP”), which denied both appeals. Id. TOL Christian Schools then appealed 
to the City Council, which held public hearings on the two BZAP decisions, and voted to uphold BZAP’s 
findings on both occasions. Id. Despite the failure of its appeals to Upper Arlington’s city council and 
BZAP, TOL Christian Schools proceeded with buying the AOL/TIME Warner Building. Id. at 891. 
 45 Id. at 892. Schools are permitted uses in residential zones. UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 5.06, tbl. 5-A. This was TOL Christian Schools’ second application to amend the 
UDO, as it had first applied to modify the UDO to allow private religious schools in the ORC. Tree of 
Life Christian Sch. III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 892. Upper Arlington’s City Council denied this application 
because it determined that doing so would produce “a facial First Amendment problem.” Id. 
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goals of the master plan and that granting the zoning amendment would con-
flict with Upper Arlington’s “long-term financial interest.”46 
Thereafter, both parties moved for summary judgment in the district court 
on the religious discrimination claims.47 On April 18, 2014, the district court 
granted summary judgment for Upper Arlington, concluding that Upper Ar-
lington’s UDO did not violate the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.48 Specifi-
cally, the district court found that a plaintiff bringing an as-applied equal terms 
challenge must produce evidence that a secular comparator received preferen-
tial treatment under the challenged ordinance.49 In making this decision the 
district court rejected TOL Christian Schools’ argument that other permitted 
uses such as daycare centers and hospitals were comparators to the school, and 
found that the school could only be compared to a nonreligious school.50 
C. Appellate Courts and Their Judicial Obligations 
One of the fundamental functions of federal appellate courts is to provide 
clarification and guidance on contested and unsettled legal issues.51 The judi-
cial system operates on the theory that the higher courts will construct or de-
scribe the legal standards that the lower courts apply to the various fact pat-
terns of their cases.52 As a result, district courts will sometimes refrain from 
deciding first impression legal issues, choosing to wait for their appellate 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Tree of Life Christian Sch. III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 892. Additionally the City Attorney told the 
city council that rezoning a commercially-zoned property to a residentially-zoned property would 
harm the aims of the master plan. Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 368. 
 47 Tree of Life Christian Sch. III, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 894. 
 48 Id. at 900. Upper Arlington argued that the proper comparator for a religious school is a nonre-
ligious or secular school, whereas TOL Christian Schools argued that “community centers, hotels, 
private clubs, lodges, bars and nightclubs, daycare centers, hospitals, and charitable organizational 
offices” could be proper comparators. Id. at 894. The district court found that the analysis of TOL 
Christian Schools’ as-applied equal terms RLUIPA claim depended on whether the UDO treated TOL 
Christian Schools on less than equal terms than a secular assembly or institution. Id. at 897. The dis-
trict court analyzed the facts under the tests set forth by the Third and Seventh Circuits, which it found 
to be the most practical. Id. 
 49 Id. at 899 (citing Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1311). 
 50 Id. at 894, 899 (stating that the proper comparator for TOL Christian Schools is a secular 
school, using an “apples to apples” comparator approach). The court determined that the UDO treats 
religious and nonreligious schools the same, and that, therefore, there was no RLUIPA equal terms 
violation. Id. at 898, 899. 
 51 See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 63–64 (2010) (discussing how the 
creation and refinement of laws is perceived to be one of the fundamental duties of appellate courts).  
 52 See Joan E. Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propri-
ety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1524–
25 (2012) (discussing the role of appellate courts in our judicial system and how they are better posi-
tioned within our federal legal system to maintain legal uniformity and predictability); Timothy J. 
Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial Self-Restraint in the Illinois Appel-
late Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 75 (2009) (stating that the primary role of appellate courts is to guide 
lower courts in sustaining a consistent and stable legal precedent). 
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courts to establish the circuit’s position.53 Thus, the significance of an appellate 
court’s decision lies in its power to set legal precedent that directs the behavior 
within its circuit and influences that of other circuits.54 
Consequently, circuit splits amongst federal courts are inherently prob-
lematic because it means federal laws are not being uniformly enforced or ap-
plied to litigants across the country.55 As a result, the Supreme Court will often 
grant certiorari to resolve a circuit split and restore uniformity across the fed-
eral judicial system.56 However, in instances where the Supreme Court does 
not step in, parties located in jurisdictions that have not yet addressed the issue 
subject to the split must bear the greatest cost, as it is their legal claims that 
remain uncertain until their circuit chooses a side.57 Thus, appellate courts 
have a responsibility to adjudicate issues of first impression with clarity and 
consistency so that predictability and uniformity can at least be restored within 
the parameters of its jurisdiction.58 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT & THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
Courts have been unable to reach a consensus on how to interpret RLUI-
PA’s equal terms provision, and have consequently developed competing 
methodologies for determining what constitutes a proper nonreligious assem-
bly or institution for the purposes of an equal terms claim.59 Section A discuss-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See, e.g., Alger Bible Baptist Church v. Twp. of Moffatt, No. 13-13637, 2014 WL 462354, at *9 
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2014) (alluding to the notion that it was the position of the appellate court to choose 
among the comparator standards and not the duty of the district court); Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Ar-
bor & Vicinity v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (abstaining from 
choosing amongst the competing comparator tests, stating that the Sixth Circuit had not yet provided 
guidance on the matter). 
 54 See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012) (granting power to appellate courts to “affirm, modify, vacate, set 
aside or reverse any judgment . . . lawfully brought before it for review”); Oldfather, supra note 51, at 
63–64 (discussing appellate courts rulemaking authority). Appellate court holdings carry the addition-
al weight of often being the final review of a legal issue. See Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right 
Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court 
Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 613 (2003) (discussing how appellate courts have replaced the Su-
preme Court as the “court of last resort” given the Supreme Court’s limited docket). 
55 See Algero, supra note 54, at 607–08 (explaining the negative consequences of circuit splits); 
Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in Judicial Priori-
ties, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 56 (2015) (same). 
 56 Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1152–53 (2011). 
 57 See Algero, supra note 54, at 622–23 (explaining how a Commission on Revision of the Feder-
al Court Appellate System found that “[t]he absence of definitive decision, equally binding on citizens 
wherever they may be, exacts a price whether or not a conflict ultimately develops”). 
 58 See id. at 620 (quoting then-Associate Justice Rehnquist discussing how litigants caught in a 
circuit split need a definite decision more so than a correct decision). 
 59 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2012) (providing no specificity as to what comprises a nonreli-
gious organization or assembly, nor what it means for a government to treat a religious organization 
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es the different tests that courts have developed to determine what is a proper 
comparator and which party bears the requisite burden of persuasion regarding 
this comparator evidence.60 Section B considers the reasoning of the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 
2016 decision in Tree of Life Christian Schools v. Upper Arlington (“Tree of 
Life Christian Schools IV”).61 
A. The Tests 
Over RLUIPA’s seventeen-year history, five circuits have explicitly artic-
ulated a test for determining a secular comparator under the equal terms provi-
sion.62 Each of these tests generally follow the same two-pronged format: first, 
establishing, as the primary issue, the criteria for identifying a nonreligious 
comparator, and then, as backend concern, stating the appropriate level of ju-
dicial scrutiny for instances of disparate treatment.63 Courts’ methods for dis-
                                                                                                                           
on less than equal terms); Crist, supra note 15, at 1148 (commenting on how the equal terms provi-
sion’s broad language has created ambiguity as to how to properly construe the provision’s meaning).  
 60 See infra notes 62–94 and accompanying text. 
 61 Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV), 823 F.3d 365, 370 
(6th Cir. 2016); see also infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 292–93 (5th Cir. 2012) (using the 
challenged regulation and the standards by which it treats religious and secular organizations dissimilarly 
as the basis for determining an equal terms violation); Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City 
of Yuma (Centro Familiar), 651 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a comparator to a reli-
gious plaintiff is generally a secular institution similarly situated as to the challenged regulation’s 
purpose, except in instances where there are concerns as to the objectivity of the stated regulatory 
purpose, in which case a locality’s accepted zoning criteria serve as the basis of comparison); River of 
Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010) (asserting that a 
secular comparator is one similarly situated as to the accepted zoning criteria); Lighthouse Inst. for 
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting a standard that 
defines a secular comparator as being similarly situated to the religious plaintiff in regards to the stat-
ed regulatory purpose of the challenged regulation); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 
F.3d 1214, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the equal terms provision literally and holding a 
secular comparator to be any nonreligious assembly or institution); Brian K. Mosley, Note, Zoning 
Religion Out of the Public Square: Constitutional Avoidance and Conflicting Interpretations of 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 465, 487 (2013) (discussing the number of cir-
cuits that have developed tests as to what constitutes a valid comparator). The equal terms provision 
has also appeared before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits, however, nei-
ther circuit explicitly adopted or rejected any of the tests for determining a proper comparator. See 
Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that the Second Circuit has not yet decided the standard for an appropriate secular com-
parator); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1236–37 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (affirming a jury verdict for the religious plaintiff, holding that there was plenty of evi-
dence that the plaintiff and the secular institution were similar for the purposes of the equal terms 
provisions). 
 63 See Foley, supra note 19, at 214 (explaining that all of the circuits’ tests address the means of 
determining an instance of unequal treatment and what standard of judicial scrutiny must be applied); 
Mosley, supra note 62, at 477 (stating that each of the circuits address how to determine a secular 
comparator and what is the requisite level of judicial scrutiny mandated by the statue); see, e.g., 
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cerning a secular comparator and disparate treatment can be divided into two 
general categories, the first looking to whether a land use regulation facially 
treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with any sec-
ular assembly or institution, and the second by looking to whether a religious 
institution is treated less favorably than a similarly situated nonreligious com-
parator.64 The two notable levels of judicial scrutiny that courts have adopted 
have been either a strict scrutiny or strict liability standard.65 
While there is a degree of overlap amongst the circuits’ tests, with some 
circuits agreeing on the first or second prong, no two tests are the same.66 Fur-
thermore, within a circuit there can be variations as to the method for deter-
mining a nonreligious comparator or the requisite level of judicial scrutiny de-
pending on whether or not the challenged regulation violates the equal terms 
provision on its face or as applied to the religious plaintiff.67 Thus, jurispru-
dence regarding RLUIPA’s equal terms provision has made it difficult for liti-
gants to discern what is necessary to satisfy a prima facie case for an equal 
terms violation case.68  
                                                                                                                           
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 264–69 (first determining what constitutes a proper 
comparator and then analyzing the necessary level of judicial scrutiny); Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 
F.3d at 1230–32 (same). 
 64 Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 291 (quoting Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1169 n.25); see 
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266 (articulating the first similarly situated standard 
in RLUIPA equal terms jurisprudence); Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1230–31 (adopting any 
secular assembly or institution as the appropriate standard). 
 65 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 269 (rejecting the strict scrutiny standard 
in favor of a strict liability standard); Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1232 (adopting a strict scru-
tiny standard). Several circuits, however, have not explicitly stated the level of judicial scrutiny they 
intend to apply, and have instead only rejected the strict scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Opulent Life 
Church, 697 F.3d at 292 n.12 (rejecting a strict scrutiny standard, but failing to explicitly endorse the 
strict liability standard or any other scheme for judicial review); River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 
F.3d at 370–73 (same). Courts have adopted differing levels of judicial scrutiny based on their inter-
pretation of the equal term’s statutory language and the extent RLUIPA codifies free exercise juris-
prudence. See Campbell, supra note 22, at 1088–89, 1091(discussing the rationale for adopting either 
a strict scrutiny or strict liability standard); Crist, supra note 15, at 1150, 1154 (same) 
 66 See Mosley, supra note 62, at 468, 476–87 (providing a general overview of each circuit’s 
interpretation of the equal terms provision, and noting that while several circuits have adopted a simi-
larly situated standard for a secular comparator, each circuit expresses a different definition of similar-
ly situated). 
 67 See, e.g., Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 (asserting that different burden-shifting frame-
works apply based on whether an ordinance violates the equal terms provision on its face or as ap-
plied); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County (Primera Iglesia), 
450 F.3d 1295, 1311 n.11 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that there are different legal standards for de-
termining a nonreligious comparator depending on how the challenged regulation is found to be in 
violation of the equal terms provision). 
 68 See Minervini, supra note 7, at 584 (explaining how the inability of the federal courts to reach 
a uniform interpretation of the equal terms provision has made it unclear for parties to know what is 
required to assert an equal terms claim, raising questions as to not only what qualifies as a nonreli-
gious comparator, but also what the effect is of a facial versus an as-applied challenge to a regulation, 
and what standard of review is appropriate if there is disparate treatment); Mosley, supra note 62, at 
2017] Sixth Circuit Adopts the Regulatory Purpose Test? 195 
In 2004, in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit became the first U.S. Court of Appeals to develop a definition of an ap-
propriate secular comparator for a religious assembly or institution in an equal 
terms provision claim.69 Under this test, any secular institution or assembly 
can be a valid comparator to a religious institution.70 The court refrained from 
incorporating the similarly situated standard utilized in Equal Protection analy-
sis because Congress omitted that language from the statute.71 Additionally, the 
court stated that it would employ a strict scrutiny standard of review, which 
prohibits unequal treatment unless the government can demonstrate that the 
land use regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.72 
The court reasoned that strict scrutiny review was most consistent with Free 
Exercise jurisprudence.73 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has since limited this test to instances 
where the challenged land use ordinance appears to facially violate the equal 
terms provision.74 When religious plaintiffs bring as-applied equal terms chal-
lenges, they must produce evidence that a similarly situated secular comparator 
                                                                                                                           
468 (stating how the uncertainty created by circuits’ competing interpretations of the equal terms 
provision negatively impacts religious organizations, government localities, and lower courts). 
 69 Crist, supra note 15, at 1149; see Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1229–31 (conducting an 
analysis of the equal terms provision and what constitutes an appropriate nonreligious comparator).  
 70 Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1230–31. 
 71 See id. at 1229 (stating that the comparator need not be similarly situated under the statute). 
Under the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence, comparators must be similarly situated to their 
protected class counterparts. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(asserting that the language of the Equal Protection Clause implicitly mandates that similarly situated 
individuals should receive equal treatment); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 671, 695 (2015) (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause typically requires that similarly 
situated persons should receive equal treatment). 
 72 Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1235; see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–74 (2007) (stating that the modern iteration of the strict scrutiny stand-
ard requires that the government show that a law in question serves a compelling state interest that is 
narrowly tailored). The strict scrutiny standard of review is applied to statutes that are suspected by 
courts to infringe upon fundamental Constitutional liberties, such as laws or governmental actions that 
violate the Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clauses. Fallon, supra, at 1268–70, 1281–83 (providing 
background on the strict scrutiny formula, and discussing its history in Free Exercise and Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence). 
 73 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1232, 1235 (holding that because recent free exercise 
jurisprudence requires the application of strict scrutiny to laws that are not generally applicable or 
neutral, a finding that a regulation violates the equal terms provision means that it must undergo strict 
scrutiny because it is neither neutral nor generally applicable). The Eleventh Circuit arrived at this 
judgment after reviewing RLUIPA’s legislative history, which states the equal terms provision was 
intended to codify Free Exercise precedent that implanted a standard of strict scrutiny. Id. at 1232; see 
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 269 (addressing the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning for 
incorporating a strict scrutiny standard of review). 
 74 See Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1311 n.11 (distinguishing between facial and as-applied equal 
terms challenges); Campbell, supra note 22, at 1092 (discussing how the Eleventh Circuit used Pri-
mera Iglesia to clarify its holding in Midrash Sephardi, Inc.); Foley, supra note 19, at 207 (explaining 
the Eleventh Circuit’s expansion of its equal terms jurisprudence). 
196 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
received preferential treatment.75 Once a plaintiff meets the appropriate initial 
burden of proof, the burden shifts back to the government.76   
The four other circuits that have officially expressed their interpretations 
of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, have all rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
test, and have instead incorporated the Equal Protection Clause’s similarly sit-
uated requirement into their analysis for identifying a secular comparator.77 
Under this similarly situated framework, courts assess disparate treatment by 
looking for a comparator that is similarly situated to the religious organiza-
tion.78  
The first test that arose out of this similarly situated analysis was the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s “regulatory purpose test,” which de-
fines a comparator as a secular institution that is similarly situated as to the 
regulatory purpose of the regulation in question.79 The rationale underlying the 
regulatory purpose test was that it parallels Free Exercise jurisprudence, which 
compares how a law “treats entities or behavior that have the same effect on its 
objectives.”80 The Third Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s application of 
strict scrutiny to regulations that violated the equal terms provision, opting in-
stead to hold the government strictly liable in instances where the religious 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1311; see Campbell, supra note 22, at 1092 (discussing how Pri-
mera Iglesia established that a plaintiff asserting an as-applied equal terms claim is required to pro-
duce evidence that it received less than equal treatment compared to a similarly situated secular com-
parator); Foley, supra note 19, at 208 (explaining how under Primera Iglesia the Eleventh Circuit 
requires the plaintiff to show that it was treated on less than equal terms compared to a similarly situ-
ated secular institution). 
 76 Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308; see also Raccuia, supra note 6, at 1876 (asserting that the 
Eleventh Circuit follows the burden-shifting framework articulated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). To 
satisfy a prima facie case for an equal terms claim, the statute requires that plaintiffs show that they 
are religious institutions treated less favorably than an applicable nonreligious comparator. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc(b)(1). 
 77 See Mosley, supra 62, at 480–87 (providing an overview of the circuits that have adopted some 
formulation of the similarly situated test). The circuits that have officially adopted the similarly situat-
ed standard as the foundation for their comparator analysis are the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Ninth, Seventh, and Third Circuits. See, e.g., Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 292–93 (utilizing 
the similarly situated language in its test); Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 (same); River of Life 
Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 373 (same); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266 
(same).  
 78 See Mosley, supra note 62, at 480–87 (describing the various ways the circuits use the similar-
ly situated analysis to establish a secular comparator and identify disparate treatment). 
 79 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266. For example, if a regulation’s purpose is 
to increase tax revenue, then religious and nonreligious institutions must equally promote or serve to 
increase tax revenue. See, e.g., id. at 270–72 (analyzing whether a government’s redevelopment plan 
and land use ordinance treated religious assemblies on less than equal terms with nonreligious assem-
blies that would equally impact the government’s regulatory objectives). 
 80 Id. at 264 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
definition of a secular comparator—“any nonreligious assembly or institution”—to be too broad. See 
id. at 268 (explaining how the Eleventh’s Circuit’s interpretation would allow religious institutions to 
locate anywhere that a secular institution could locate under the city’s plan). 
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plaintiff established disparate treatment.81  To balance the government’s strict 
liability, the Third Circuit placed the burden of persuasion on the religious in-
stitution to show that there was unequal treatment.82 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also defined a 
proper comparator as a similarly situated secular organization, but uses “ac-
cepted zoning criteria,” in place of the Third Circuit’s “governmental objec-
tives in enacting the regulation,” to assess similarity.83 Under this formulation, 
even religious and secular institutions that vary in a multitude of ways are still 
similarly situated for the purposes of the equal terms provision if they are simi-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 269. Despite the fact that the strict liability standard is more consistent with free exercise 
jurisprudence, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to create a standard of strict 
scrutiny for the equal terms provision because, unlike RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, the 
equal terms provision does not include any strict scrutiny language. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) 
(stating that the government is prohibited from implementing a land use law that creates a substantial 
burden on a religious organization’s free exercise unless the government can show that the law in 
question “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest”); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d 
at 268–69 (discussing the absence of the strict scrutiny language in the equal terms provision); Camp-
bell, supra note 22, at 1086 (explaining the Third Circuit’s rationale for rejecting the strict scrutiny 
standard). Thus, the Third Circuit does not allow for unequal treatment even if the government is able 
to demonstrate a compelling state interest. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 269 
(discussing the impact of the strict liability standard). The Third Circuit explained its strict liability 
standard as giving “teeth” to the equal terms provision, ensuring that despite narrowing the scope of 
who qualifies as a secular comparator, government entities will be incentivized to comply with the 
RLUIPA and Free Exercise precedent. Id. at 269 n.14. 
 82 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 270 (explaining that the equal terms 
provision requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that it received less than equal treatment in comparison 
to a secular institution that had the same impact on the goal of the land use regulation); see also Cen-
tro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 n.47 (discussing the burden the Third Circuit places on the plaintiff); 
Raccuia, supra note 6, at 1877 (asserting that the Third Circuit allocates the burden of persuasion on 
the religious plaintiff and notes that the opinion fails to acknowledge the language of RLUIPA Section 
2000cc-2(b)). 
 83 River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 371. For example, in a commercial district that 
prohibits noncommercial uses, a church and a community center would be similarly situated for pur-
poses of the equal terms provision, because both would be prohibited. See id. at 373 (providing exam-
ples of what it means for a religious institution to be similarly situated with respect to accepted zoning 
criteria to a secular institution). The reason for the Seventh Circuit’s departure from regulatory pur-
pose test was that it viewed zoning criteria as a more objective test. Id. at 371. The court explained 
that the difference between regulatory purpose and accepted zoning criteria is not “merely semantic,” 
asserting that purpose, or the intent behind a regulation, is vulnerable to the subjective interpretation 
of local government authorities. Id. In contrast, the court felt that zoning criteria was an objective 
standard to compare secular and religious institutions, as federal courts can just apply a local govern-
ment’s pre-articulated zoning criteria to determine whether the institutions are similarly situated. Id.; 
see Tokufumi J. Noda, Comment, Incommensurable Uses: RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision and 
Exclusionary Zoning in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 52 B.C.L. REV. 
E. SUPP. 71, 76 (2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3197&context=
bclr [https://perma.cc/G4TV-W3KC] (explaining how the the zoning criteria is a more objective ap-
proach). Some of the judges on the Seventh Circuit, however, found the difference from the majority’s 
refinement of the Third Circuit’s test to be negligible. River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 
374–75 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
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lar in respect to accepted zoning criteria.84 While the Seventh Circuit rejects 
the Eleventh Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny, the majority opinion does 
not explicitly state if it endorses the strict liability standard or any other level 
of judicial review.85 Relatedly, in formulating its new test, the Seventh Circuit 
fails to articulate how it allocates the burdens of production and persuasion, 
making it unclear as to whether it is complying with the statute’s burden-
shifting framework, or, if like the Third Circuit, it is placing a greater burden 
on the religious plaintiff.86 
A third variation of the similarly situated comparator analysis has been to 
fuse together the regulatory purpose and zoning criteria tests.87 This approach 
was established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and it gen-
erally applies the “regulatory purpose test” to identify disparate treatment, ex-
cept in instances where the use of the “zoning criteria test” is necessary to 
avoid self-serving subjectivity.88 The Ninth Circuit rejects the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s strict scrutiny requirement, stating that in order for a land use regulation 
that facially provides disparate treatment to religious institutions to stand, the 
regulation “must be reasonably well adapted to accepted zoning criteria.”89 
The Ninth Circuit, however, departs from the standards of the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits by explicitly adopting the burden-shifting framework articulated 
by Section 2000cc-2(b) of RLUIPA.90 
                                                                                                                           
 84 River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 371. The court explained that the concept of 
equality under the equal terms provision was similar to the notion of equal pay for equal work, despite 
the differences in identity among the workers. Id. 
 85 See id. at 370–73 (describing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to review claims under the equal 
terms provisions with strict scrutiny as lacking “textual basis,” but providing no commentary as to the 
Third Circuit’s strict liability standard). Judge Sykes in her dissent, however, seems to suggest that the 
majority adopted the Third Circuit’s strict liability standard. See id. at 391 (Sykes, J., dissenting) 
(quoting the Third Circuit’s explanation as to why the strict liability standard is not constitutionally 
problematic, and then stating that the majority “align[ed] themselves with the Third Circuit’s view”). 
 86 See id. at 368–74 (majority opinion) (making no mention of the burden-shifting framework in 
RLUIPA Section 2000cc-2(b) or assertion of the requisite burdens of persuasion and production). But 
see Raccuia, supra note 6, at 1879 (asserting that like the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit allocates 
the burden of persuasion on the religious plaintiff without referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). 
 87 See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text (describing the variation of the similarly situated 
comparator analysis established by the Ninth Circuit). 
 88 Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173; see Mosley supra note 62, at 486 (describing how the 
Ninth Circuit relies on both the Third and Seventh Circuits’ articulations of a test for a similarly situ-
ated comparator). 
 89 Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1175 (quotations omitted). Despite articulating a standard of 
review for a regulation that facially violates the equal terms provision, the Ninth Circuit does not 
discuss what is the appropriate standard of review for as-applied challenges, nor does it comment on 
the Third Circuit’s strict liability standard. See id. at 1165–75 (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s reason-
ing for employing the strict scrutiny standard, but failing to discuss the Third Circuit’s strict liability 
standard). 
 90 See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-2(b) (establishing that once a plaintiff meets its burden of production 
and establishes a prima facie case, the government bears the burden of proving each element of the 
case); Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d. at 1173 n.47 (stating that it would break from the Third Circuit’s 
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The most recent approach to the similarly situated analysis emerged from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which compares religious and 
secular institutions on the basis of the criteria specifically stated in the ordi-
nance.91 This test can be distinguished from the regulatory purpose and zoning 
criteria tests to the extent that those tests use zoning criteria or regulatory ob-
jectives that do not arise from the language of the challenged land use law it-
self.92 The Fifth Circuit did not officially adopt any standard of judicial review, 
but, like the Ninth Circuit, it formally adopted RLUIPA’s statutory burden-
shifting analysis.93 Under this burden-shifting framework, once a religious as-
sembly establishes the prima facie case, the government bears the burden of 
persuasion on the plaintiff’s equal terms claim.94 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision 
On May of 2016, a panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the application of the City of Up-
per Arlington’s UDO violated RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.95 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                           
analysis regarding the allocation of the burden of persuasion, because Section 2000cc-2(b) requires 
that the burden of persuasion fall on the government once a religious plaintiff has satisfied a prima 
facie case). In instances where a challenged regulation facially violates a land use provision, however, 
the Ninth Circuit seems to place the burden of production and persuasion on the government rather 
than the plaintiff. See id. at 1173 (asserting that in instances of facial violations, the burden falls on the 
government to show that it did not treat a religious organization on less than equal terms) Further-
more, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis concentrates on what “equal means in the context,” meaning an 
institution’s relation to other concerns. Id. at 1172 (quotation marks omitted). 
 91 See Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 292–93 (establishing that its test measures the disparate 
treatment “by the ordinance itself and the criteria by which it treats institutions differently”). 
 92 Id. at 92 n.13. 
 93 See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-2(b) (outlining the burden-shifting framework that applies to the equal 
terms provision); Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 291–92 (stating that it finds the strict scrutiny stand-
ard an improper statutory interpretation and that it follows the RLUIPA’s mandated burden-shifting 
framework). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a land use regulation 
that on its face treats religious institutions on less than equal terms compared to secular institutions meets 
the prima facie case for a facial violation claim. Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 292. 
 94 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-2(b); Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 292. 
 95 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 371–72. Prior to Tree of Life Christian Schools III, the 
district courts in the Sixth Circuit had refrained from choosing or developing their own tests regarding 
what constitutes a proper comparator. See Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington (Tree 
of Life Christian Sch. III), 16 F. Supp. 3d 883, 895 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d and remanded 823 F.3d 
365 (2016) (stating how the Sixth Circuit had not yet adopted a test for determining a proper secular 
comparator, and choosing to analyze the equal terms claim under the Third and Seventh Circuits’ tests 
because it found those to be the most rational); see also Alger Bible Baptist Church v. Twp. of Moffatt, 
No. 13-13637, 2014 WL 462354, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2014) (abstaining from choosing among the 
competing comparator tests, stating that the Sixth Circuit had not yet provided guidance on the matter); 
Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor and Vicinity v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766 (E.D. 
Mich. 2013) (same). 
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the majority found that TOL Christian Schools pled sufficient facts to allege 
that at least some of the assemblies or institutions permitted under the UDO in 
the ORC district, such as daycare centers and ambulatory care centers, were 
similarly situated relative to the UDO’s regulatory purpose to TOL Christian 
Schools, in that these uses would not maximize income tax revenue.96 In con-
trast, the majority explained that Upper Arlington failed to provide evidence 
that the secular uses it would prefer for the office building TOL Christian 
Schools purchased would employ higher-income workers than TOL Christian 
Schools.97 As a result, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for the district court 
to determine whether there were secular institutions allowed under the UDO 
that were comparable to TOL Christian Schools because they would not max-
imize income tax revenue.98 
Despite stating that it would not adopt one of the comparator tests, the 
Sixth Circuit’s majority’s focus on the UDO’s stated purpose to increase in-
come tax revenue suggests that the majority preferred the Third Circuit’s regu-
latory purpose comparator test.99 Furthermore, the majority appeared to place 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 371–72. In deciding that there was an issue of fact 
and reversing the district court’s order for summary judgment, the majority cited three cases of which 
only one is from the Sixth Circuit, and the most recent being from 1984. Id. at 370–71 (citing Hasan v. 
Clevetrust Realty Inv’rs, 729 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1984); Hess v. Schlesinger, 486 F.2d 1311, 1313 
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Ostermann, 534 F. Supp. 581, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 97 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 372. The court also stated that Upper Arlington 
provided no evidence that these accepted secular uses under the UDO would cause less traffic or out-
door noise than the TOL Christian’s proposed school. Id. 
 98 See id. at 372. In its holding the court also seemed to hint that TOL Christian Schools should 
prevail on remand. See id. at 371 (explaining that the secular uses permitted by Upper Arlington ap-
pear to be similarly situated to the UDO’s regulatory purpose of increasing tax revenue, and express-
ing skepticism that TOL Christian Schools would be harmful to this goal). The court stated that be-
cause the equal terms provision bars discrimination regardless of the “time, place, and manner,” Upper 
Arlington’s claim that TOL Christian Schools was permitted to locate in 95% of Upper Arlington was not 
a defense to discriminate against the school in the remaining 5% of its jurisdiction. Id. at 372. 
 99 See id. at 370–71 (stating first that it would not choose among the various circuits’ comparator 
tests, but then proceeding to frame the issue for review as whether TOL Christian Schools had pled 
sufficient facts to show that the UDO gave preferable treatment to secular organizations that would 
not fulfill the UDO’s stated purpose of maximizing income tax revenue); see also Karla Chaffee et al., 
Did the Sixth Circuit Unintentionally Adopt an RLUIPA Equal Terms Test?, ROBINSON & COLE (May 
23, 2016), https://www.rluipa-defense.com/2016/05/did-the-sixth-circuit-unintentionally-adopt-an-
rluipa-equal-terms-test/ [https://perma.cc/BYF8-4NHC] (discussing the possibility that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision unofficially adopted the Third Circuit’s similarly situated in regulation test). The Sixth 
Circuit’s language seems to implicitly reject the Eleventh Circuit’s test in favor of the other circuits’ 
“similarly situated” based tests. See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 370–72 (using the 
similarly situated language throughout its analysis). Additionally, the fact that the court states that 
“TOL Christian Schools has pled facts sufficient to allege that at least some of these assemblies . . . 
are situated, relative to the government’s regulatory purpose, similarly to TOL Christian Schools” 
suggests that the Sixth Circuit may be in support of the Third Circuit’s test. See id. at 372 (explicitly 
utilizing the language of the Third Circuit’s regulatory purpose test in its holding); see also Light-
house Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 264 (establishing that “the Equal Terms provision . . . 
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the burden on Upper Arlington to refute TOL Christian Schools’ allegations 
that permitted uses under the UDO were similarly situated to TOL Christian 
Schools.100  
Judge Helene White, who wrote an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, argued that the majority’s analysis of the as-applied equal terms 
RLUIPA challenge was in error.101 Judge White asserted that TOL Christian 
Schools could not establish a prima facie case for a RLUIPA equal terms pro-
vision claim because it failed to identify a similarly situated nonreligious as-
sembly or institution that received more favorable treatment under the UDO.102 
Specifically, Judge White argued that TOL Christian Schools failed to provide 
evidence that it could generate tax revenue comparable to the secular institu-
tions it offered as comparators.103 Consequently, unlike the majority, Judge 
White found TOL Christian Schools’ allegations that daycares, hospitals, and 
non-profits were similarly situated to TOL Christian Schools to be insufficient 
to create an issue of genuine material fact, and that Upper Arlington was enti-
tled to summary judgment.104 
                                                                                                                           
require[s] . . . a secular comparator that is similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose of the regula-
tion in question”). 
 100 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 371–72 (asserting that TOL Christian Schools 
“pled facts sufficient to allege” rather than produced sufficient evidence, as well as remarking on 
Upper Arlington’s failure to offer evidence that its permitted uses would employ higher-paid workers 
than TOL Christian Schools, suggests that the majority placed the burden of persuasion on the gov-
ernment); see also Edward Sullivan, Divided Sixth Circuit Panel Reverses Summary Judgment to City 
in RLUIPA Case, GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER (June 17, 2016), http://www.gsblaw.com/northwest-
land-law-forum/divided-sixth-circuit-panel-reverses-summary-judgment-city-rluipa-case/ [https://
perma.cc/8EPD-SFNQ] (commenting on how the Sixth Circuit’s majority in Tree of Life Christian 
Schools seemed to place the burden of persuasion on the government whereas the dissent placed it on 
the TOL Christian Schools). Thus, despite using the Third Circuit’s comparator standard, the Sixth 
Circuit implicitly rejects the Third Circuit’s placement of the burden on the religious plaintiff. Com-
pare Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 372 (stating that unless the government could show 
that no secular organizations could be similarly situated to TOL Christian Schools, TOL Christian 
Schools’ allegations were sufficient to survive summary judgment), with Lighthouse Inst. for Evange-
lism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 270 (asserting that the religious plaintiff bears the burden). The Sixth Circuit’s 
seeming allocation of the burden of persuasion on the government, rather than the religious plaintiff, 
is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s application of RLUIPA’s statutory burden-shifting scheme. See Tree 
of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 371–72 (using language that alludes to the government carrying 
the burden of persuasion); Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 (stating that the government bears the 
burden of persuasion). 
 101 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 373 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 381. 
 104 Id. at 379–82. Judge White conducted a similarly situated analysis of daycares, hospitals, and 
charitable offices that used the Seventh Circuit’s similarly situated analysis with respect to the zoning 
criteria test, and held each of these comparators to be unavailing. Id.; see Sullivan, supra note 100 
(discussing and supporting Judge White’s reasoning as to why the alleged comparators were insuffi-
cient to show disparate treatment). The majority, however, criticized her analysis, stating that Judge 
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Thus, at the root of her opinion, Judge White disagreed with the majori-
ty’s apportionment of the burden of producing a proper comparator, advancing 
the notion that unless a plaintiff can identify a satisfactory secular comparator,  
a plaintiff cannot satisfy a prima facie case for a RLUIPA equal terms claim.105 
She concluded that the majority’s holding provides TOL Christian Schools 
with “not equal treatment, but special treatment.”106 
III. ADDING TO THE CONFUSION: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION NOT TO ARTICULATE A STANDARD  
FOR THE LOWER COURTS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in choosing not to 
articulate a legal standard for an appropriate comparator in its 2016 decision in 
Tree of Life Christian Schools v. Upper Arlington (“Tree of Life Christian 
Schools IV”).107 This Part discusses the negative ramifications of the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision not to officially create or adopt a test for deciding what consti-
tutes a proper comparator.108 Additionally, this Part argues that this confusion 
is compounded by the fact that the Sixth Circuit majority utilized the language 
and analytical framework of the regulatory purpose test, but used a competing 
framework in allocating the burden of persuasion on Upper Arlington.109 
The Sixth Circuit’s failure to express a standard for determining an ap-
propriate nonreligious comparator has imbued the equal terms provision with 
unnecessary uncertainty.110 Given that the subtle variations in the competing 
equal terms tests can produce different results, it is unclear the extent to which 
the equal terms provision protects religious assemblies’ constitutional rights 
within the Sixth Circuit.111 Local governments are similarly affected, in that 
                                                                                                                           
White’s opinion engaged in a factual analysis that was inappropriate at this juncture in the litigation. 
See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 372. 
 105 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 377–78 (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (stating that it was TOL Christian Schools’ responsibility to identify a similarly situat-
ed secular comparator that the UDO provided more favorable treatment); Sullivan, supra note 100 
(asserting that the dissent would require the burden to be on the religious plaintiff to demonstrate that 
it was treated less favorably than a secular comparator). 
 106 Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 382 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 107 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV), 823 F.3d 365, 
370 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that it would not decide among the various circuits tests in its holding). 
 108 See infra notes 110–117 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 114–117 and accompanying text. 
 110 See Storm, supra note 52, at 75 (asserting that one of the fundamental functions of appellate 
courts is to provide lower courts with predictable and stable legal precedents). 
 111 See generally Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d 365 (making no explicit endorsement of 
any of the other circuits’ equal terms comparator tests, nor their corresponding levels of judicial scru-
tiny and burden-shifting framework). Compare Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 
279, 292–93 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring that disparate treatment be measured by the explicit language of 
the regulation), with Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma (Centro Familiar), 
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the Sixth Circuit’s decision has made it ambiguous as to what is required of 
them to comply or challenge an equal terms provision claim.112 Finally, in 
choosing not to articulate a standard, the Sixth Circuit has deprived its district 
courts of a meaningful solution to a legal issue that is fraught with litigation 
and competing views.113 
The Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion’s silence in Tree of Life Christian 
Schools IV further complicates RLUIPA equal terms provision litigation for the 
circuit’s district courts because the majority seemed to implicitly adopt the 
regulatory purpose test, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s version of RLUIPA’s 
burden-shifting scheme.114 Without providing an explanation or clear statement 
of their intent, it is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit actually endorses any of 
the articulated approaches or whether it intends to develop its own future test 
for analyzing RLUIPA equal terms provision claims.115 This uncertainty is ex-
acerbated by the fact that the Tree of Life Christian Schools IV decision was 
not unanimous, as Judge White’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part took a position entirely contrary to the majority.116 Consequently, the low-
er courts have no definite way to approach RLUIPA equal terms provision is-
sues, and the confusion could produce contradictory or split results within the 
Sixth Circuit itself.117 
                                                                                                                           
651 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (adopting both the zoning criteria and regulatory purpose tests, 
but diverging from their analytical framework by following the statutory burden-shifting analysis for 
as-applied challenges, but placing the burden of production and persuasion on the government in faci-
al challenges), with River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 
(7th Cir. 2010) (establishing the zoning criteria test), with Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. 
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266–70 (3d Cir. 2007) (utilizing the regulatory purpose test, and 
incorporating a standard of strict liability). 
 112 Compare Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173–75 (holding that a regulation’s prohibition of 
churches and schools on a commercial block violated the equal terms provision using the “accepted 
zoning criteria” test), with River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 371(holding that a regula-
tion’s prohibition of churches and schools was permitted under the “accepted zoning criteria” test). 
 113 See Sullivan, supra note 100 (discussing the extent of the conflict regarding how to interpret 
the equal terms provision clause, and stating that it will take the Supreme Court to settle the circuit 
split). 
 114 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 371–72 (using the Third Circuit’s similarly 
situated in regulation analysis, but seeming to adopt a similar burden-shifting framework utilized by 
the Ninth Circuit, which provides the religious plaintiff a lighter burden of production). 
 115 See id. at 370–72 (explicitly stating that the court was not adopting a test for determining a 
proper comparator for an equal terms provision claim, but then using language that suggested the 
majority approved aspects of the Third and Ninth Circuits’ tests); Chaffee et al., supra note 99 (illus-
trating how practitioners could easily think that the Sixth Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s test of 
what constitutes a valid secular comparator). 
 116 See Tree of Life Christian Sch. IV, 823 F.3d at 382 (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (illustrating the stark differences between the majority’s interpretation of the equal terms 
provision and Judge White’s interpretation). 
 117 See, e.g., Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington (Tree of Life Christian Sch. 
III), 16 F. Supp. 3d 883, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d and remanded 823 F.3d 365 (2016). The analy-
sis at the district court level highlights the potential for inconsistent outcomes within the same circuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
In its 2016 decision, Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City of Upper Ar-
lington, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit squandered an oppor-
tunity to articulate a clear standard for an appropriate comparator for its district 
courts and practitioners. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s silent utilization, and 
seeming approval of different portions of competing circuits’ tests, sends con-
flicting and confusing messages to its lower courts and RLUIPA litigants. Con-
sequently, rather than acting as a light or sign amidst a pool of varying inter-
pretations of a similarly situated comparator, the Sixth Circuit has muddied the 
waters not only for its own district, but the national circuit split. 
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See id. (stating that despite the fact that a comparator test had not been developed in the Sixth Circuit, 
the court would use the Third and Seventh Circuits’ tests because it found them “to be the most rea-
sonable and pragmatic”); see also Alger Bible Baptist Church v. Twp. of Moffatt, No. 13-13637, 2014 
WL 462354, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2014) (abstaining from choosing amongst the competing compara-
tor tests, stating that the Sixth Circuit had not yet provided guidance on the matter); Muslim Cmty. Ass’n 
of Ann Arbor &Vicinity v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (same). 
